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Abstract  
Corporate governance has come to the forefront of academic research due to the vital role it plays in the overall 
health of economic systems. The wave of U.S. corporate fraud in the 1990s was attributed to deficiencies in 
corporate governance. The recent 2008-2009 global financial crisis, triggered by the unprecedented failure of 
Lehman Brothers and the subprime mortgage problems, renewed interest in the role corporate governance plays 
in the financial sector. The development of a strong corporate governance framework is important to protect 
stakeholders, maintain investor confidence in the transition countries and attract foreign direct investment.  This 
paper looks at the role of corporate governance in European transition countries in their transformation to a 
market economy. The paper compares the different levels of corporate governance established among the 
transition countries.  
Keywords – corporate governance, transition countries, emerging economies, legal heritage and transitional 
reforms, market transition. 
 
1. Introduction 
The transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe have privatized their economies at an unprecendented 
speed in the 1990s. The expectation was that under private ownership, for merly state-owned firms would act as 
dynamic, profit oriented players driving economic restructuring and growth. Yet, the expectation has rarely been 
fulfilled, and lack of effective corporate governance is often seen as a culprit. Transfer of ownership to private 
hands does not suffice to create powerful incentives for managers to engage in the market economies along the 
objectives of the new owners. This articles outlines the methods of privatization used in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and their consequences in terms of corporate governance. Many stakeholders acquired shares in 
ownership, which enhances their ability to influence management and creates complex challenges for managers 
to coordinate influential stakeholders. Central and East European economies may thus develop unique forms of 
capitalism, especially with respect to corporate governance systems. Corporate governance is often seen as a 
major obstacle to business in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Corporate governance refers to mechanisms 
that ensure that managers act inthe owners’ best interest. In the transformation from central plan  to market 
economy, privatization had a central place in policy agenda, yet the transfer of ownership alone does not suffice 
to create appropriate incentives for managers. The theory of property rights, primarily the principal-agent model, 
has been the ideological foundation of the privatization policy.However, many firms did not, as presumed by the 
model, end up in outside control but under the governance of a variety of stakeholders, including managers, 
employees, and the state. 
Corporate governance generally refers to the set of rule-based processes of laws, policies, and accountability that 
governs the relationship between the investor (stockholder of a company) and the investee (management). 
Corporate governance attracted a great deal of attention in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1998 and the early 2000s U.S. corporate scandals, like Enron and World Com. However, once the threat of 
global contagion financial crises passes, corporate governance was relegated to the back of academic research. 
The current global financial crises of 2008-2009 caused by the “excesses of capitalism” once again brought 
attention to the importance of effective corporate governance practices. With ever more closely integrated 
globalized financial markets, the newly emerging European transition economies particularly have been hit hard 
by the adverse impact of the current global financial crisis. Both the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD)and the OECD promote the development of sound corporate governance for transitioning 
economies and developing economies through their initiatives, the Corporate Governance Sector Assessment 
Project (CGSAP begun in 2002) and Principles of Corporate Governance (1999, 2004, 2009), respectively.  A 
strong corporate governance foundation is important for a growing market economy. It has to include the 
integrity and transparency of financial and corporate operations, checks and balances in compliance with 
applicable laws, the practices of sound financial and corporate operations and accounting practices that are in 
accordance with international standards. In the legal sector, laws that are enacted must be timely and consistently 
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enforced. The laws must be clear and consistent: in areas of orderly entry and exit of firms, property and asset 
protection of investors and transparency of the legal system. Establishing effective corporate governance is of 
particular importance for transition countries because its success is crucial not only for the growth of a healthy 
corporate sector but also for sustaining a healthy market economy. Bekaert et al (2001) find that the 
liberalization of financial markets in transition countries increases economic growth by about 2 percentage 
points per year. Some countries like Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia have very low effective corporate 
governance with high incidences of corruption and fraud in the political and economic systems. Other countries 
like Poland, Hungary and Latvia have established relatively effective corporate governance with greater 
achievements made toward market-based economies. 
The problems facing transition countries are different from those facing other emerging countries by their nature 
of transforming from a centrally planned economy to an open market economy. For transition countries with no 
initial capitalistic framework in place, institutional frameworks in all sectors, both private and public, which 
support a capitalistic business environment, have to be created simultaneously: securities laws, corporate laws, 
accounting standards, sound business practices and ethics, and a judiciary and regulatory system.  
  
2. Defining Corporate Governance  
In the literature of corporate governance, there is a disagreement about the boundaries of the subject of corporate 
governance. Depending on their perspective, different authors define corporate governance in different ways. In 
its narrowest sense, corporate governance can be viewed as a set of  arrangements internal to the corporation that 
define the relationship between the owners and managers of the corporation. An example is the definition by 
Monks and Minow (2001): corporate governance “...is the relationship among various participants in 
determining the direction and performance of corporations. The primary participants are (1) the shareholders, (2) 
the management, and (3) the board of directors."  
 
3. Literature Review  
The Asian crisis brought the issue of corporate governance to the forefront of research. Most of the studies on 
the developing and emerging countries focus on the agency problem and weak, dispersed investors. Later studies 
focus on corporate governance in developed economies especially after the U.S. corporate fraud scandals. The 
topics range from internal and external governance, the role of the Board of Directors, incentives and 
compensations, ethics and transparency. Most are based on the Anglo-American (common law) models (Chew 
and Gillan, 2005). This model of widely dispersed shareholders where no single shareholder owns a majority 
stake is the basis of most corporate governance studies. Most authors argue that the protection of investors’ 
interests can be effectively enforced through a strong corporate governance system (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Glaeser et al, 2001;Hanousek and Kocenda,2003). The Anglo-American corporate governance system 
differentiates the shareholders from the stakeholders with a well-developed external equity market system to 
monitor the manager. The additional protection and voice afforded a dispersed shareholders group in the Anglo-
American model is the liquidity of the market to allow exit strategy in the event of weakening internal corporate 
governance. The well developed financial market in developed economies with rating agencies, market scrutiny 
and access to timely information is another layer of protection for the dispersed shareholders. Another body of 
studies tests the adoption of common laws (Anglo-American) versus civil laws (German-French) in the 
protection of investors (Coffee 1999, Pistor, 2000; Mahoney, 2001). Mahoney (2001) finds that nations that 
adopted the common laws (English) rather than the civil laws (French) system of corporate governance provided 
better protection for investors and have better developed financial markets. Mahoney concludes that, during the 
period under study from 1960-1992, common law countries experienced faster economic growth than civil law 
countries because common law is more supportive of private economic enterprises and property protection while 
civil law is more oriented toward government intervention and restrictions. Corporate governance studies 
naturally move to focus on the transition countries in their unprecedented mass privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the structure wherein they operate to transform successfully to a market economy. 
Studies on corporate governance structures in transition countries debated various issues: the type of ownerships 
(concentrated versus dispersed), the mode of privatization, adequacy of shareholder protection and whether legal 
structures must precede privatization. Ownership structures in transition countries are still evolving. Widely held 
firms are not the norm due to the small and relatively illiquid underdeveloped capital markets.  Corporate 
governance studies performed on developed countries therefore may not be applicable to transition countries 
with such different initial conditions. The corporate governance problems in transition countries are likely to be 
different from developed countries. Studies on corporate governance in transition countries may therefore have 
to take this into account. A body of studies looks at whether a transition country’s past legal heritage (German, 
French) influences the adoption of the current legal structure and corporate governance or whether the Anglo-
American system is more prevalent (Pistor, 2000;  Martynova and Renneboog (2009). In Romania and Poland, 
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the mass privatization and dispersed ownerships to employee owners and institutional intermediaries help to 
promote the development of the capital and securities markets (Gray and Hanson, 1993). Their main argument is 
that the German-Japanese model of active shareholding monitoring through intermediaries (banks, outsider, 
employee-owners) can develop closer ties to firm managers, better access to information, and deeper business 
knowledge than the Anglo-American model of dispersed shareholders.The German-Japanese model of more 
concentrated ownership with corporate governance assigned to intermediaries may therefore be more appropriate 
for transition countries. This argument is supported by other studies. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Rajan and 
Zingalies (1998) maintain that concentrated corporate ownership structures are a response to the agency problem 
and poor ownership protection for investors.  Studies by La Porta et al (1997, 1999, and 1999) also support this 
hypothesis and that the degree of ownership rights and protection affects corporate behavior and, consequently, 
economic development. On the other hand, Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) argue against concentrated shareholders 
and creditor banks but rather dispersed shareholders are more effective in controlling managers in transition 
countries where the legal environment is ineffectual, a situation similar to late nineteenth-century Japan. This 
body of literature looks at the differing degree of legal protection with different corporate governance structures 
depending on whether concentrated or dispersed ownership is present. Privatization of state-owned enterprises 
goes beyond just transferring the assets to private ownership in transition countries. Privatization has to be 
evaluated in terms of three areas: the creation of a system of corporate governance to foster a healthy 
environment government ownership still1, moral hazard incentives, kwangsi (relationships), and agency 
problems outweighed emerging corporate governance practices. Lin (2001) finds that managers, while gaining 
greater autonomy from the “corporatization” of Chinese state- owned enterprises, manage the company badly 
and misuse it for self- dealings and embezzlements. Privatization of former state-owned assets to private 
ownership does not guarantee that the agent will act in the best interest of the principle in transition countries 
with no existing institutional foundation to support for businesses to flourish, the advancement in legal and 
enforcement infrastructure, and self-sustaining economic growth. There are a number of studies on the positive 
and negative effects of privatization in transition countries.Privatization of state-owned enterprises is seen to be 
the vehicle by which transition countries are transformed to a market economy and takes different forms. The 
expectation is that private ownership would spur profit-oriented managers toward market restructuring leading to 
economic growth under the presumption of the principal-agent model. In most transition countries this 
expectation has been unfulfilled due to the lack of effective corporate governance and a major obstacle to a 
friendly business environment (Meyer, 2003).  In transition countries, the problem of corporate governance 
progress is exacerbated by the vested interest of the powerful and highly concentrated owners with ties to the 
political structure. This cronyism relationship breeds corruption that plagues the early transformation efforts of 
most of the transition countries. This is particularly prevalent in transition countries like China, Russia, and 
Bulgaria. In China when the state- owned enterprises were “corporatized” with majority government ownership 
still1, moral hazard incentives, kwangsi (relationships), and agency problems outweighed emerging corporate 
governance practices. Lin (2001) finds that managers, while gaining greater autonomy from the 
“corporatization” of Chinese state-owned enterprises, manage the company badly and misuse it for self-dealings 
and embezzlements. Privatization of former state-owned assets to private ownership does not guarantee that the 
agent will act in the best interest of the principle in transition countries with no existing institutional foundation 
to support private ownership. Questions of the role and rights of various stakeholders (manager-employee 
owners, government, outsiders, managers, investors, employees) of the privatized firms with differing interests 
have to be determined within a legal and regulatory structure. The Russian experience questions whether mass 
privatization is the answer in transforming from central- planning to a market economy. Russia’s mass 
privatization to concentrated manager ownership was the antithesis of privatization success: insider self- dealings, 
corruption, incompetent management, asset stripping and the destruction of minority shareholders’ value.  
 
4. The Sources of Corporate Governance 
Discussions of corporate governance demonstrate two basic approaches to assuring managerial dedication to the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders: the regulatory approach and the non-regulatory approach. The 
regulatory approach relies upon formal rules and institutions backed by the coercive power of the state’s legal 
system.  In the United States, which has a system of federal law, each of the fifty states has its own corporation 
code. In addition, judicial decisions by state courts have developed important legal doctrines governing corporate 
behavior, such as "the business judgment rule" and the duties of care and of loyalty of corporate officers and 
directors.  American state corporation laws are very similar, but not identical. Indeed, the corporate laws of 
certain states may favor one interest group over another. Throughout the twentieth century, individual American 
states, seeking to maximize revenues from corporate franchise taxes, competed to become state of Delaware is 
the legal home to about 60 per cent of the Fortune 500 companies. The principal source of corporate governance 
in Europe is the legislation of the individual European country concerned. Although European Union legislation 
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does have an impact on certain aspects of corporate governance, it has not unified corporate governance practice 
to the same extent as U.S. federal law and regulations, together with stock exchange rules, have tended to unify 
American practices. Thus, there is a greater divergence on corporate governance rules among publicly traded 
European corporations than there is among their American counterparts. 
 
5. Corporate Governance in Transition Countries 
 The difference in the corporate governance problem in transition countries is one of controlling versus minority 
shareholders problem. The early privatization of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) resulted in mostly 
concentrated ownership by dominant or block- shareholders, (institutional investors - Hungary, management 
buyout (MBOs) or management-employee buyouts (MEBOs) - Poland, employee-owners – Czech), giving these 
controlling shareholders considerable greater control over corporate assets than their stock ownership warranted. 
Of even greater concern than the concentrated ownership is the prevalence of complex ownership structures 
through cross-shareholdings, multiple-class shareholdings with different voting rights, pyramidal corporate 
shareholdings. A landmark study by Bebchuk et al (1999) shows that “expropriation costs” are very large when 
such complex shareholdings are used to increase control rights beyond their cash- flow rights, even larger than 
concentrated ownerships.  The role of corporate governance to under girth weak competitive market mechanisms 
and democratic political institutions is the complementing factor necessary to sustain the long-term 
modernization of the transition countries. In other words, the “principal- agent” relationship that governs most 
capitalist societies that provides the incentives and environment in which investors (principals) can reap the 
profits of their investment through their corporations (agents) and the behavioral relationship are determined by a 
set of corporate governance standards. EBRD’s Legal Indicator Surveys reports that transition countries have an 
implementation gap between the enactment of laws and its enforcement. Unlike developed countries in the 
United States and United Kingdom with widely dispersed shareholders, the principal-agent corporate governance 
problems are primarily due to the agent (manager) perpetrating embezzlement and fraud. The corporate 
governance regime of the English legal origins (US-UK) emphasizes the protection of shareholders from being 
expropriated by the firm’s management. In contrast, the European legal origin countries (French-German) 
emphasize the protection of stakeholders (state, blockholders, employees) from expropriation. A relationship-
based system and investor expropriation tends to prevail in emerging economies. In Russia, Bulgaria and 
elsewhere mass privatization enriched the oligarchs and the politically well connected. The “cronyism” and 
relationship-based structure carried over from the communist era with most of the post - communist corporate 
owners part of the politically connected or political elite is difficult to root out. The lack of effective corporate 
governance, in particular, Russia, engenders a hostile business environment : corruption, organized crime, a bias 
judicial system and government interference. In the post-socialist European countries, the set of corporate 
governance standards adopted varies which may depend on past legal heritage. The group of Central and Eastern 
Europe and Baltic (CEEB) nations has a German legal heritage which includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The group of South East 
European (SEE) nations has a French legal heritage which includes the Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bosnia 
and Albania. The last group consists of most of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Pistor (2000) 
finds that past legal heritage is not significant in explaining what predominant system of legal structure will be 
adopted by the transition countries. Rather, the adoption during the initial transformation period is driven more 
by the desire to converge with the EU legal system with an eye to attaining accession or the US system. Pistor 
also observes that differences in legal reforms among the transition countries are due primarily to policy makers 
responding to economic changes : greater privatization engenders better protection of creditor’s and 
stockholder’s rights or whether the dominant external advisors are from the US or EU. Mahoney (2001) similarly 
argues that a nation directly or indirectly adopts a set of legal structure in response to change rather than solely 
because of its past legal heritage. Poland and the Czech Republic are good examples of differences in 
privatization, corporate governance development and economic growth. An interesting study by Coffee (1999) 
compares the differences between Poland and the Czech Republic experience. Both countries adopted corporate 
law system based on the German civil law heritage. The important difference is that despite the German heritage, 
Poland’s securities regulations and practices follow the common law system of the Anglo-American more 
closely : greater private ownership protection, stringent disclosure standards and a strong enforcing securities 
commission agency. Coffee concludes (1) that better securities regulation to protect minority shareholders from 
expropriation is more effective than ineffective corporate laws, (2) that the Anglo-American common laws 
structure of corporate governance outperforms the German - French civil law structure despite their legal 
heritage. The result is the successful growth of equity financing for businesses in Poland with a growing healthy 
growing stock market. The Polish stock market is one of the largest among the transition countries with a market 
capitalization of U$175.85 billion in 2010; in contrast, the Czech Republic stock market capitalization is only 
U$68,831.   
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6. Stages of Market Transformation  
Transition economies are former centrally planned economies undergoing unprecedented, comprehensive 
transformations to market-driven economies (World Bank,2002). Planned and market economies are opposing 
economic systems adhering to different institutional frameworks (King, 2001; Martin,2002; Peng,2003; 
Williamson,1995). An institutional framework is a set of formal constraints such as legal and regulative systems; 
and informal constraints such as social values, codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions that 
regulate human behavior and economic activity (e.g.,the use of norms of trade associations to regulate exchanges; 
social pressure to ensure that parties perform their duties) (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). The institutional 
framework associated with a centrally planned economy, which we label the bureaucratic control institutional 
framework, principally underlies public ownership, state coordination, redistribution, and control (Boisot & 
Child, 1988;Kornai,1990). The institutional framework associated with a market economy (market institutional 
framework) principally underlies private ownership and market transactions (Kornai, 1990; Williamson,1995).  
Institutional theorists assert that the replacement of an institutional framework with a new one often occurs in 
three stages: dominance of the old framework, emergence of an interim framework with some elements of both 
frameworks, and finally prevalence of a new framework (Benson,1977; Gerry, 2000; Lachmann,1979; 
North,1990). We suggest transformation from bureaucratic control to the market institutional framework is likely 
to go through an interim (intermediate) stage, during which the formal rules associated with the centrally planned 
system weaken rapidly. The new market rules evolve slowly, forcing various constituents to rely on informal 
constraints (Lachmann,1979; McMillan & Woodruff,2000; Peng,2003; Peng & Heath,1996). The intermediate 
period therefore can be defined as the relational stage dominated by a relational institutional framework 
(Peng,2003). Although one institutional framework is dominant in a particular stage, the three institutional 
frameworks tend to coexist during the transition process, and together constitute a larger societal institutional 
environment (Benson,1977; North,1990).  Extant literature on transition economies documents the existence of 
three stages. The factors inherent in the bureaucratic control stage (i.e., state ownership, intervention, and 
redistribution) have been reported in various studies (e.g.,Andreff,1999; King,2001; Kornai,1990; McCarthy & 
Puffer,2003; Stark, 1994; Suhomlinova,1999). Andreff (1999) showed that in 1995, after six years of transition, 
the average state ownership in former socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe was 58 percent; among 
them the Czech Republic had the lowest level of state ownership (31%), and Tajikistan and Turkmenistan had 
the highest (85%). The existence of a relational stage is also well documented (e.g., King,2001; McMillan & 
Woodruff, 2000; Peng,2003; Peng & Heath,1996). These studies have demonstrated that widespread, 
relationship-based exchange tends to emerge systematically in transition economies due to the absence of formal, 
market-based laws and regulations. Finally, some transition economies (e.g., those of the Czech Republic and 
Poland) have now progressed to the late stage of transition as they now have an advanced market institutional 
framework (Tihanyi & Roath,2002).  
We do not focus on the investigation of how transition economies progress. Instead, we assume transition 
economies are committed to transforming to a market economy and are likely to go through the three stages we 
specify. We believe that bracketing the transition process into different stages with fairly distinct institutional 
trajectories is useful in examining the impact of institutions and institutional changes on corporate governance in 
transition economies.  
 
7. Corporate Governance environment in Croatia   
 After privatisation process started in 1991, interest in corporate governance has been raising parallel to the 
growth in private sector. Improvement in corporate governance is seen through better access to capital, 
promoting efficient performance and development, transparency compared to European requirements and rules 
and accountability. In consideration to corporate governance there is also some important issues to be mentioned, 
primarily related to the history of social ownership and all aspects of adjustments in transition period. 
Privatisation process was undergone according to the model, which was severely criticized in public and because 
of that partly cased inefficient industry sector. The weak side of privatisation model was that some enterprises 
are privatised without inflow of new capital and ex managers begun new owners without investing their own 
money. A consequence was inadequate composition of boards and in many cases performance was unproductive 
and inefficient. In Croatia managing of enterprises is regulated by Company Act following German law, while 
the Securities Law are regulated mostly against Anglo-American securities market legislation. Now, Croatia is in 
the process of reviewing all legislatives according Directives of the European Union.  Croatian system of boards 
is two-tier. Supervisory Board is responsible for monitoring enterprise leadership and thus could investigate all 
record keeping and documentation, cash etc. regarding business performance. Top Management (called 
Managerial Board or Board of Directors) are committed to inform Supervisory Board about business policies, 
profitability, income statement, liquidity etc. at least once a year. Guiding corporate strategy and corporate 
performance including interests of stakeholders is not the function of Supervisory Board. The emphasis is on 
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monitoring performance through financial data and that is the main difference between Board of Directors and 
Supervisory Board. Supervisory Board members chosen by the owner have in many cases only formal role of 
monitoring and their influence on enterprise performance is disputable. In the case of mixed ownership or small 
shareholder ownership, members of Supervisory Board are chosen at the basis of skill and they are more 
accountable for efficiency performance of enterprise (Vitezi, 2003). In public enterprises Supervisory Board is 
selected upon party representation. Managerial Board main role is responsibility for running business affairs, i.e. 
business politics, profitable performance and others affairs. It consists of several members and one of them is 
chairman, usually owner. They are confirmed by Supervisory Board and could be hired or fired by them. But the 
role of Managerial Board is stronger especially in the cases where the Supervisory Board is only a formal body 
and has not much influence to the enterprises decision- making process (stated owned enterprises). Comparing to 
the recent literature on the subject (Nadler, 2004) there are different types of boards: passive, certifying, engaged, 
intervening and operating. Operating makes key decisions that other directors and managers then implements, 
and this kind of board is the most similar to the one exist in Croatia. They are responsible for business policies of 
the enterprise and in the case include the one main owner if he is the only one. The tendency should be on high 
performance board, which will be competent, coordinated, collegial and focused on an unambiguous goal.  With 
changing from social to market oriented economy many believed that these changes would help enterprises to 
gain competitive advantages and therefore contribute in increasing national efficiency. Privatisation is based on 
the premise that it will improve enterprises performance and help countries grow. But the effects are different on 
aggregate or micro level and depend on industry structure. In a cross- country aggregate study, Sachs, Zinnes 
and Eilat (2000, Vol.III) state that privatisation does not by itself increase GDP growth, but they suggest that a 
positive effect is present when privatisation is accompanied by in-depth institutional reforms. Applicable to 
Croatian economy, inflation rate is low and decreasing from 6.2 per cent in 2000 to 2.1 in 2004. and GDP rate 
vary from 2.9 per cent in 2000. to 5.6 per cent in 2002, decreasing to 3.3 per cent in 2004. It is obvious that 
institutional reforms but also more important stabilization, industry restructuring, financial discipline and new 
investment are prerequisite for increasing of macroeconomic indicators. Additionally, privatisation force 
enterprises restructuring and therefore is accompanied with changes in management, corporate governance and 
organisation structure.      
 
8. Corporate governance indicators   
 In this research corporate governance indicators are considered through some attributes of boards, particularly 
their structure, size, independence, internationalisation, diversity, frequency of meetings and others. Disclosure 
is investigated through existing information especially about board members, remuneration disclosure and 
adoption of ethics code. The results are as follows : Board structure.  In Croatia companies have two-tire system 
(as in Germany,Austria, France, etc.–in fact, only 23 percent in Europe) comprising a Supervisory board of 
outside members close to the owners, and a separate Managerial Board of executive directors. The two boards 
meet separately with strictly defined accountability under the law.Concerning board internationalisation, in 
Europe boards are more domestic with only 16 per cent of non-national directors, than the companies themselves. 
Contrary to the surveyed companies, the percentage of foreign members (one or few) in Supervisory or 
Managerial board is higher (20.8 per cent) in Croatia.  Average ages of boards are in 68 per cent up to 45 year if 
the majority ownership is foreign, and in the rest of 31.8 per cent of enterprises are from 25 and 35 years. In 
domestic enterprises there are 82 per cent of them up to 45. Board member’s average age in Europe is 55 years. 
On average, directors have been 5.6 years on the same board what are little over than in Croatia (around 5 years). 
In the European board, the number of women increases from 6 to 7 per cent. In Croatia this percentage is much 
lower and is less than 1 per cent in Supervisory board. Only in Managerial board, women contribute with over 10 
per cent.   Board size. The number of board size could not be considered as a factor, which determines efficient 
performance or has crucial impact to performance. There are a few reasons for explanation of this statement. 
First, board size is commonly determined by national law or listing requirements. Second, it is mostly based on 
the enterprise size and sector and therefore considered “appropriate”. Third, the knowledge of each member is 
very important for the efficiency of board decision- making. The emphasize is on effective board no matter of 
size, which means that board should be of sufficient size and the balance of skills and experience is ap to the 
requirements of the business. In Croatia the average board (Supervisory) size is five and in accordance to the law 
minimum size is 3 and maximum 21 members depending on equity amount. Croatia average is still lower than 
the minimum size in Germany (8) and Austria (6) who has the same two-tier model. This could be explained by 
the size of enterprises and structure of owners. In Croatia 95 per cent of total enterprises are small, mostly with 
no obligations to have supervisory board. Middle sized and large enterprises contribute with rest five per cent 
and in majority have one or few owners. In some research made by Čengi (2001) it is confirmed that chair 
persons of boards (Supervisory and Management) with domestic owners are in the most cases long term 
employees or managers of these firms from the period before privatisation process started. Additionally, they 
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have essential influence on processes relating to the structure of Supervisory or Managerial board.Independence 
of board Croatian board name Supervisory board is not independent related to the law requirements and German 
model of two-tire board structure. Considering separation of chairman and CEO, two-tire board structure ensures 
the separation of roles. The member of the Supervisory board could not be at the same time a member of 
Managerial board.  Audit committee Beginning of the 2001, after starting accounting scandals, the role of audit 
committee has come under close scrutiny. The audit committee responsibilities are to monitor and review the 
integrity of enterprise financial statements, its internal financial controls, the external auditor’s independence and 
objectivity and the effectiveness of the audit process as a whole. Hence, the independence of audit committee is 
very important for its effectiveness. The independence of the audit committee is 64.5 per cent and varies 
considerably from minimum 4 per cent of companies with a majority independent audit committee in Japan to 
over 95 per cent in UK, Netherlands, Canada, USA, Ireland and Luxembourg (Maier, 2005).  Disclosure.  In 
addition to all information company should include in disclosure, the remuneration policy pay attention to 
shareholders and others, particularly because of the relation with enterprise performance.Remuneration also 
should motivate members of boards to run the company successfully, but remuneration level should be 
determinate with contribution to the efficiency growth. Croatian enterprises mostly (80 per cent of them) not 
disclose information on the remuneration of Supervisory or Managerial board members. This is regarded as good 
practice and from the survey of 24 countries in the world  (Maier, 2005), the average of disclose is 84 per cent.  
Comparing the frequency of board meetings with remuneration, the average compensation per board meeting in 
Europe is 7,301 EURO per 2005. (Albert- Roulhac, and Breen, 2005). In Croatia Company Law defines 
frequency of board meetings. Supervisory board is committed to have quarterly meetings or at least semi-yearly. 
The average meetings as result from questionnaire are 6. (5.8 times). The average in Europe countries who has 
two-tier board are 6.7 meetings and is notable that unitary board has more frequent meetings (9.3) comparing 
with two-tire, but also is evident continues slight increase. (Albert-Roulhac, and Breen, 2005). When looking for 
good governance practice, the implementation of code of ethics is highly supported. In recent years a number 
governmental and private initiatives have focused on the need to reduce corruption, bribery, fraud etc. and urged 
a need to improve standards of corporate governance ethics, transparency and integrity. In Europe in average 73 
per cent of companies have a meaningful code of ethics, and Croatian enterprises are not much below that (70 
per cent). However, existing code of ethics if not strictly implement could not protect against all illegal doings. 
 
9. Corporate Governance environment in Slovenia   
Slovenia has made a rapid progression from a state controlled economy. After independence in 1991, Slovenia 
quickly sought to develop its capital markets and the legal, regulatory and institutional structures that underpin 
these markets. On gaining independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991, a mass-privatisation programme 
began in 1992 that established the private ownership of capital. This was reinforced with the passage of the first 
framework Companies Act in 1993. Slovenia rapidly pursued political and economic integration with Europe, 
joining the European Union (EU) in May 2004 and the European Monetary Union in January 2007. Since joining 
the EU, the Government has also pursued a comprehensive strategy to amend its capital markets and 
corporations law architecture in order to ensure consistency with EU directives. While implementation of EU 
standards has provided Slovenia with a solid legal framework in the field of corporate governance, the accession 
review has focused on the implementation of the OECD Principles through the practices of the regulatory 
authorities and the dynamic capacity of the system to change in response to evolving market practice. Capital 
markets in Slovenia are limited in both depth and liquidity and have a narrow (and domestically focused) 
investor base. The current state of development of Slovenia’s capital markets, and corporate governance 
framework, must be seen through the prism of its historical development. The Stock Exchange, which has itself 
been recently taken over by the Vienna Stock Exchange, is relatively small with total equity market 
capitalisation of EUR 8.5 billion which represented 25.2% of GDP (as at 31 December 2008).  However, while 
the rate of progress has been impressive, two key corporate governance challenges remain. First, Slovenia has 
retained significant ownership of commercial enterprises. As shown by the experience of OECD Members, this 
can be a problematic area. When companies are owned by governments, they can be inefficient, uncompetitive, a 
drain on public finances and used to pursue political objectives. The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Gove 
rnance of State-Owned Enterprises stress that effective ownership by government requires coherent and 
transparent policy and the capacity to make objective and commercial decisions as a shareholder. The Slovenian 
Government recognises this challenge and introduced significant reforms in early 2010. Second, after less than 
twenty years, Slovenia’s legal and regulatory architecture of governance and the cultural norms of operating 
private capital markets are not yet well developed. A key focus of the Committee in carrying out its review was 
on ensuring that not only were the legal and regulatory frameworks in place for effective corporate governance, 
but that regulators and policy makers are adequately resourced, and have the appropriate political support to 
ensure that the systems could promote and enforce appropriate market behaviour.  In the course of the review, 
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the Government commenced comprehensive reform to its corporate governance framework. In mid-2009 the 
Government formally adopted an Action Plan for Corporate Governance Reform in Slovenia. This Action Plan 
commits the Government to a range of actions that would improve corporate governance practices in Slovenia, 
including a review of the legislative provisions protecting minority shareholder rights; an increase in the capacity 
of the judicial and regulatory authorities to monitor and enforce compliance with corporate laws, and 
improvements in the way in which state owned enterprises are governed. To give effect to the Action Plan, the 
Government endorsed a Policy on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, the centrepiece of which 
was a commitment to pass legislation to establish a separate central ownership agency to coordinate all 
government ownership actions. The Policy also proposed legislation to better define the relationship between the 
Government, KAD and SOD, and to structure these separate funds as portfolio investors at arms’ length from the 
Government.The legislation establishing the central ownership agency (the Law on the Corporate Governance of 
State Capital Investments) was adopted by the National Assembly on 20 April 2010. Under the new law, the 
agency will control all the direct holdings of Government in companies established under the Corporations Law; 
exercise all of the ownership rights pertaining to all shareholdings (both direct and indirect) including board 
nominations; gather centralised information on government holdings; measure and report performance; and 
develop and enforce a code  of corporate governance that will apply to SOEs. The agency will operate 
independently of existing ministries, and will have a Council and a management board whose members will be 
appointed by a qualified majority of Parliament on the recommendation of the Government. The law provides 
that the agency must be set up within three months of the  adoption of the legislation. Once established, the 
agency has another three months within which to adopt a code of corporate governance for SOEs. It will also, as 
part of its mandate and within three months of its establishment, define and allocate financial assets by their 
groupings (marketable, non-marketable, strategic, public interest, etc.) and define the State’s objectives for these 
asset groups. Under the draft legislation to define the relationship between the Government and the two state-
controlled funds (KAD and SOD), KAD will be separated into two funds: one being a pension fund manager, 
and the other an insurance company. The central ownership agency will assume responsibility for exercising the 
shareholding rights (such as voting) attaching to the KAD and SOD shareholdings. Following public 
consultation, the legislation for the reform of KAD and SOD has been adopted by the Government and was 
planned to be submitted to parliament in the middle of 2010.  
9.1 Ensuring the enforcement of shareholder rights and equitable treatment. 
The legal framework in Slovenia provides a relatively high degree of protection for shareholders, in particular 
minority shareholders. There is limited capacity for large shareholders to use capital structures to obtain 
disproportionate control and qualifying majorities are required to effect substantial changes to the constitution of 
the company or the capital structure.Minority shareholders powers of redress are predominantly exercised 
through the general meeting, and include rights to seek the appointment of independent auditors to verify a 
number of matters, including the financial accounts, alleged breaches of the articles of association or specific 
transactions. While the legal rights are strong, the capacity of shareholders to enforce their rights is partly 
constrained. At a practical level, minority shareholders are widely dispersed with limited economic interests in 
the companies in which they are shareholders. To exercise their rights via the general meeting, shareholders must 
have a threshold level of voting interest (either 5 or 10% depending on the circumstances), meaning that often 
only the larger shareholders have the practical means to seek some form of redress. The court system has in the 
past been slow and is having to adjust to a dynamic legal and commercial environment, which limits its effect 
iveness as a forum for settling corporate actions. Legislation passed in 2009 giving effect to the EU’s 
Shareholders Rights Directive will make significant steps towards addressing these concerns. Furthermore, the 
Government is undertaking a study focused on further improving the enforcement of the provisions of the 
Companies Act dealing with minority shareholders rights. The study is due to be completed in 2012. Slovenia 
has also recognised the importance of efficient and competent courts, as evidenced by actions taken in order to 
enable specialisation, reduce court backlogs and improve their efficiency. 
 
10. Main types of relationships between governing and management functions in companies in 
Central European transitional economies 
Two extreme views prevail today regarding the corporate governance system (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsov,256). 
The new neo-classical school considers shareholders as the only group that governs a company. The corporate 
social responsibility school requires looking beyond the classical concept of shareholders’ wealth by suggesting 
the stakeholders’ approach. Many authors prefer to deal with the so-called outsider (USA, UK) and insider 
(Germany, Japan, other parts of Continental Europe) systems of corporate governance (Gregorič et al., 186). 
Dispersed ownership and liquid capital markets as well as strong investors’ legal protection are an important 
assumption of the outsider corporate governance system. The strong legal protection of creditors, a highly 
concentrated ownership and relatively illiquid capital markets, as well as favouring the stakeholders’ approach 
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seem to be the basic assumption of the insider system. Legal regulations can allow or forbid the concentration of 
voting rights in different countries. It is not allowed everywhere that shareholders concentrate their voting rights 
without concentrating ownership. For example, Germany and the Netherlands allow it. Banks and other financial 
companies are not allowed to be shareholders in a number of countries. The Anglo-American system does not 
allow the legal institutionalisation of the employee right to share ownership or profit in companies (the right to 
economic democracy) (Zalar, 37).One can find an autonomous corporation surrounded by markets in an Anglo-
American environment on one hand, and on the other hand, business groups as a typical constellation of 
corporations, mostly with the financial corporation in the centre, in Continental and Northern Europe (Collin & 
Ceslajs,163). Taking into account all the stated differences, one can better understand the logic and distinctive 
features of the outsider and insider corporate governance systems that we frequently deal with as the Anglo-
American and German governance models (Rozman,103). These two models can also be seen as a one-tier and a 
two-tier model.   
The Anglo-American corporate governance system is based on: 
• The organisation of a large independent corporation 
• A board of directors that is quite independent regarding its shareholders and stakeholders 
• Corporations situated in environments characterised by strong financial markets and small 
government intervention 
• A competitive culture 
• A legal system that discourages ownership by banks and other financial organisations. 
The model consists of two governance bodies: the shareholders’ assembly and the board of directors. Members 
of the board of directors are insiders and outsiders. The board has two main tasks: 1) controlling the business 
results and 2) controlling strategic decisions.  
The German (Continental European) model is based on (Collin  & Cesljas, 167): 
• Business group systems that dominate in the economy 
• Weak financial markets 
• A strong government intervention 
• A rather co-operative or authoritarian culture 
• Close connections between corporations and financial organisations. 
The model incorporates three governing bodies: 1) the shareholders’ assembly, 2) the supervisory board, and 3) 
the board of directors. Representatives of employees are also members of the supervisory board. Members of the 
board of directors cannot be outsiders. The main tasks of the supervisory board are to hire and fire the board of 
directors and to supervise the company’s business performance. Mainly the law determines the role of the 
corporate governance function. 
European transitional countries were able to choose between the stated two governance models. Central 
European countries chose mainly a variant of the German model. However, Russian reformers opted for the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsov, 250). E.g., the Republic of 
Macedonia’s Law on Trade Companies introduced a solution that allows both the one-tier and two-tier models 
(Drakulevski,1132). The Commercial Code determined the corporate governance model in Poland. Its main 
characteristics are derived from the German model. The shareholders’ assembly, the supervisory board, and the 
board of directors are characteristic of the two-tier system. Slovenia and Croatia introduced similar systems. The 
German model applied and the still existing wide dispersion of ownership in Central European transitional 
countries enable top managers to behave rather independently and to hold major power in their hands. The 
described governance power distribution is quite typical for large domestically privatised companies nowadays. 
In the pre-transition period, the governance power was with external owners (governments mostly). The 
privatisation of large, state-owned companies brought mainly dispersed ownership of large, domestically 
privatised enterprises, and thus the governance power has been transferred to executive managers (slightly more 
so in companies with a dominant share of internal owners than in those with a dominant share of external owners) 
(See Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Changing patterns of the governance power distribution in domestically privatised large companies in 
Central European transition economies 
 
11. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The corporate governance function provokes reconsideration everywhere today. We do not believe that a 
uniform corporate governance model will be appropriate for all countries, neither for all transitional countries. 
Historical, cultural, economic and political realities have strong influences on its suitability. In spite of this fact, 
different models will certainly have many common characteristics and they are worth being identified.The 
modest accumulated experiences with the governing practices in Central European transitional countries and 
their analysis can identify the main directions for the future development of corporate governance models in this 
part of Europe.The analysis shows that we need to further develop the stakeholders’ governance model that will 
not deny the central role of owners’ interests in corporate governance. On the other hand, the owners’ interests 
should not be the only ones that are incorporated in the corporate governance process. The corporate governance 
function must start to look beyond just the shareholders’ wealth creation. Knowledge-based industries demand 
highly knowledgeable employees that invest and risk much in providing their expert knowledge. Their 
remuneration is high enough that they are able to accept variable pay systems linked to corporate financial 
performance. They are, therefore, the most important group of stakeholders, beyond owners, entitled to 
participate in corporate governance. We do not see that on this base a workers’ self-management system of 
corporate governance has to be developed. The dominant power within corporate governance has to be balanced 
according to the level of risk that individual stakeholders take over. We believe that investors in companies will 
be those who will carry the biggest risk still for an extended period of time in transitional countries because 
domestic capital is still a very scarce resource in these environments.  
Slovenia should conduct a formal review of the provisions of the Companies Act within the anticipated time 
frame dealing with the treatment of minority shareholders to ensure that they provide adequate protection of 
shareholder rights in practice and give due consideration to any recommendations from that review. 
Slovenia should consider further measures to support the financial and operational independence of the 
Securities Market Agency, including ensuring that the Agency has sufficient and independent financial capacity 
for its mission and its activities; ensuring that the Supervisory Board and management are appointed according 
to arrangements that ensure their independence; and consider the exemption of employees of the Agency from 
public sector employment arrangements. 
Regulators and policy makers should remain vigilant in monitoring the potential for “share parking” activities, 
particularly in relation to takeovers, to ensure that current legislative and enforcement arrangements are adequate 
to prevent such practices.  
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